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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GILBERT CAPSON and LINDA
his wife,

CAP SON,

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
A. J. DEAN READY MIX CON-

CRETE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Case No. 15431

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff, Gilbert Capson
against defendant A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete Company for
damages arising from a trench cave-in.

In addition, plain-

tiff Linda Capson has sued defendant for loss of consortium
and for medical and family expenses incurred by her on behalf
of her husband.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the Honorable David Dee on September 13, 1977 as to all
claims by both plaintiffs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court
-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants in their statement of facts have ~2:reatly s1m·
plified the procedural aspects of this case.
first filed in 1974.

This case was

It has been reviewed and ruled upon by

a number of District Court J·udges and by this Court 1·n a previous appeal.

The following is a brief outline of the pro-

cedural path this litigation has taken.
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on September 9,
1974 alleging that plaintiff Gilbert Capson suffered damages

in the amount of $102 ,000 as a result of negligence caused
by two Utah corporations - -A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete Company (hereinafter Ready Mix Co.) and Arctic Circle, Inc.
In addition, plaintiff Linda Capson claimed $5 ,000 for loss
of her husband's services and for support of her husband and
family.

This complaint consisted of three separate causes

of action.

(R., pp. l-4).

Defendant Ready Mix filed an answer to plaintiff's com·
plaint on October 15, 1974.

(R., pp. 7-9).

The other defen·

dant, Arctic Circle Inc., filed a motion to dismiss on October
10, 1974 on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted.

(R., pp. 15-16).

Subsequently,

defendant Ready Mix Co. filed its motion to dismiss upon the
same grounds.

(R., p. 28).

-2-
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on December 22, 1975 the Honorable Bryant H.

Cr~ft

granted both motions to dismiss but gave leave to amend
plaintiffs' complaint.

(R., pp. 31-32).

Accordingly, a se-

cond amended complaint was filed by plaintiffs on January 9,
1976 identical to the original complaint except that a
fourth cause of action was added claiming that plaintiff
Gilbert Capson was employed by Arctic Circle and was therefore entitled to receive medical expenses and unemployment
benefits from defendant Arctic Circle.

Also, plaintiff Linda

Capson sought reimbursement for money expended by her for
medical expenses and maintenance of the family.

(R., pp.

33-40).
Once again, defendant Arctic Circle moved to dismiss the
second complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief
could be granted and failure of the court to have jurisdiction over the controversy.

(R., pp. 41-42).

Defendant Ready

Mix filed an answer to the second amended complaint alleging
affirmatively, inter alia, that plaintiffs were barred from
bringing such action because of the provisions of Section
35-1-60 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

(R., pp. 43-45).

Defendant Arctic Circle's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint was granted by the Honorable James Sawaya on March
1, 1976.

(R., pp. 50-51).

order of dismissal.

Plaintiffs appealed from this

(R., p. 52).
- 3-
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Pending the Arctic Circle appeal defendant Ready Mix
moved for a dismissal.
able Marcellus K. Snow.

This motion was denied by the Honor(R., p. 59).

On November 4, 1976 this Court published its decision
concerning the Arctic Circle appeal.
P.2d 505).

(R., pp. 64-65; 556

Justice Henriod in speaking for a unanimous court

held that plaintiffs' complaint showed that Gilbert Capson was
a subcontractor working under the direction and control of
Arctic Circle Inc.

This Court ruled that under Title 35-1-42

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, plaintiff became an employee of
Arctic Circle and was therefore precluded from bringing a
suit against it and that Capson's remedy was provided by
Workman 1 s Compensation.

The lower court ·decision was affirmed,

On August 17, 19 77 defendant Ready Mix Co. moved for a
summary judgment based upon this Court's decision in the Arc·
tic Circle case.

On September 13, 1977 the Honorable David

Dee granted defendant Ready Mix' s motion for summary judgment
against both plaintiffs.

(R., pp. 97-98).

the present appeal is taken.

From this order

(R., p. 99).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH WORKMAN COMPENSATION LAWS IN
EFFECT AT THE TI:ME OF PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT PRECLUDES AN ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT READY MIX CO.
The accident in this case occurred on July 26, 1972.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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As

:uch, any claims arising out of this accident were controlled

by the law then in effect.

Section 35-1-42 in part states:

Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and such work is
a part or a process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor,
and all persons employed by him, and all
subcontractors under him, and all persons
employed by any such subcontractors, shall
be deemed, within the meaning of this-sec=tion, employees of such original employer.
(Emphasis added).
section 35-1-60 provides an exclusive remedy against an employer, or officer, agent or employee of an employer.

This

section states in part the following:
The right to recover compensation pursuant
to the provisions of this title for inJuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting
in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent
or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act
shall be in place of any and all other civil
liabilities whatsoever. (Emphasis added).
Section 35-1-62 addressed itself to injuries or death
caused by wrongful acts of third parties.

This section in

1972 stated:
When any inJury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall
have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in the
case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee or his
heirs or principal representative may also
have an action for damages against such third
person. (Emphasis added).
-5-
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Section 35-1-62 was subsequently amended by the 1975 le .
gisla ture in which the term "same employment" was omitted and
language speaking in terms of "employer" or "employee of
said employer" was substituted.

In addition, the following

paragraph was added:
For the purpose of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his
heirs or personal representative may also
maintain an action for damages against
subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or
their lessees or assigns, not occupying
an employee-employer relationship with
the injured or deceased employee at the
time of his injury or death.
This statutory scheme in effect during 19 72, this Court's
decisions interpreting such statutes, and the pleadings of
the plaintiffs conclusively establish that the trial court
was correct in granting judgment in favor of defendant Ready
Mix Co.
As noted by this Court in the previous appeal, plain·
tiffs' own pleadings allege that Arctic Circle, Inc., the
general contractor, was the employer of plaintiff Gilbert Cap·
son as defined in Section 35-1-42.

Such pleadings also show

that defendant Ready Mix Co. was acting under the control of
Arctic Circle Inc. and was therefore a subcontractor of Arc·
tic Circle at the time of the accident.
cond amended complaint.

See plaintiff's se·

(R., pp. 33-39 and appellant 1 s brief,

pp. 3-6).
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Thus, it is agreed by the parties that both plaintiff
Capson and defendant Ready Mix were subcontractors and thereby each became a "statutory employee" of the general contractor
Arctic Circle as defined by Section 35-1-42, U. C. A.
Appellants contend that even though this relationship existed under Section 35-1-42 this status is not controlling
for purposes of Section 35-1-60 and 35-1-62 for determining
"same employment".

(Appellant's brief, pp. 3-7).

However,

the law existing at the time of plaintiff's accident is contrary to appellant's position.

This Court in several de-

cisions clearly held that statutory employees were precluded
from suing the employer or other "statutory employees."
In Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U.2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968)
an employee of a general contractor sued the owner of a truck
for injuries sustained by the employee.

This Court concluded

that the defendant in that case was acting under the control
and direction of the general contractor and as such was an employee of the plaintiff's employer.

This Court stated:

We, therefore hold that the defendant was
an employee of Gibbons and Reed Company
within the meaning of Section 35-1-42,
U.C.A., 1953. This being so, the plaintiff must look to Workman's Compensation
insurance coverage and is prevented by
Section 35-1-60 from suing the defendant
in this case. 442 P.2d at 34.
In 1972 this Court in Peterson v. Fowler, 27 U.2d 159,
493 P.2d 997

(1972) held that an employee of a general con-7-
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tractor could not maintain an action against a su b contractor
"in the same employment" as the general contractor.

Justice

Ellett in a unanimous decision clearly defined the meaning
of "same employment":
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged
in the same line of work and labor together
in such personal relations that they can
exercise an influence upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect of their
mutual safety. They should be at the time
of the injury directly operating with each
other in the particular business at hand, or
they must be operating so that mutual duties
bring them into such co-association that they
may exercise an influence upon each other to
use proper caution and be so situated in their
labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of each other as
to skill, diligence, and carefulness. When
workmen are so engaged, we think they are
working in the same employment. 493 P.2d at
1000. (Emphasis added).
In Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 U.2d286,
508 P.2d 805 (1973) this Court again established the relationship between Sections 35-1-42 and 35-1-62.

In the

Adamson case an employee of a subcontractor attempted to sue
the general contractor.

This Court held that Section 35-1-42

automatically made the plaintiff's employer (the subcontrac·
tor) an employee of the general contractor and as such the
plaintiff was precluded from maintaining an action against
the general contractor since he was then in the "same employ·
ment" as the defendant as enumerated in Section 35-1-62.

This

Court in the Adamson case also made a pertinent statement as
-8-
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to the purpose of a Workman Compensation Act and its application.

The Court said:
[T]he purpose of the Act is to provide
speedy and certain compensation for workmen and their dependents and to avoid the
delay, expense and uncertainty which were
involved prior to the Act; and the concomitant purpose of protecting the employer
from the hazards of exorbitant and in some
instances perhaps ruinous liabilities.
Those principles are applicable here and
correlated to them is the proposition that
the Act should be liberally construed and
applied to provide coverage and effectuate
those purposes. 508 P.2d at 807.

In Peterson v. Fowler, 29 U.2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 (1973)
this Court decided the second appeal involving the death of
the general contractor's employee caused by a fall in a
sports arena.

In the first appeal this Court affirmed the

dismissal of the subcontractor on grounds that it was in the
same employment as the decedent's employer and therefore was
protected from suit by Section 35-1-62.

In the second case

several other defendants had been granted summary judgments
by the trial court.

This Court held that two of the three

defendants were materialmen to the subcontractor and were
therefore not in the "same employment" as the decedent.

How-

ever, the Court sustained the motion for summary judgment as
to these defendants on the grounds there was no evidence
showing any negligence on their part.
Appellants' assertion that defendant Ready Mix Co. was
a materialman to this project and not in the "same employment"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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as plaintiffs (appellants' brief, pp. 6-7) is without merit
in view of plaintiffs' own pleadings in the complaint and
the undisputed fact throughout this appeal that Ready Mix
Co. was a subcontractor of Arctic Circle.

For example,

appellants clearly state this fact in their brief when they
say, "We have a subcontractor bringing suit against another
subcontractor".

(Appellants 1 brief, p. 5).

Thus, any "ma-

terialman" distinction raised by appellants is completely
inapplicable to the facts and pleadings of this case.
The final and perhaps most controlling case is Shupe v.
Wasatch Electric Company, 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976).

In that

case the survivors of a deceased workman who was an employee
of the general contractor sued a subcontractor for alleged
negligence in causing the employee's death.

The accident

occurred on July 19, 1974.
This Court held that at the time of the accident

Secti~

35-1-42 placed the employee in the same employment as the
subcontractor and thus no cause of action was permissible.
This Court acknowledged the 1975 amendment to Section
35-1-62 and stated the following:.
The legislature, undoubtedly being aware
of the decisions of this Court construing
the terms "same employment" in 1975 amended
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A., 1953 by adding the
following provision:
"For the purposes of this section
and notwithstanding the provisions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of Section 35-1-42 the injured
employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also maintain
an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors,
independent contractors, property
owners or their lessees or assigns,
not occupying an employee-employer
relationship with the injured or
deceased employee at the time of
his injury or death."
The amendment if applicable would leave the
plaintiffs in Court. Id. at 898. (Emphasis added).
This Court rejected a retroactive application of the
amended statute.

Citing Section 68-3-3, U.C.A., 1953 as au-

thority this Court stated the following:
The amendment above referred to provides
a cause of action on behalf of an injured
workman against individuals not covered
by the statute prior to its amendment.
To apply the statute retroactively would
compel a new class of individuals to assume risks which did not exist prior to
the amendment, and we are of the opinion
that retroactive application would deny
equal protection to a new class brought
within the terms of the statute as amended
so as to deprive them of equal protections
of the laws. Id. at 898.
Appellants throughout their brief argue that it is unfair
to make the persons who are employees under 35-1-42 persons of
the same employment under 35-1-62 and that appellants cannot
imagine any situation in which any class working on the same
job could sue another class working on that job.
brief, p. 6).

(Appellants'

Obviously, the arguments advanced by appellants
-11-
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in their brief and by Justice Maughn's dissent in the Shu~
decision had persuasive weight on the 1975 legislature which
amended Section 35-1-62 to prevent a statutory employee from
being automatically deemed an "employee" for purposes of
Sections 35-1-60 and 35-1-62.
However, the very fact of amendment shows that the prior
statute in effect at the time of the accident included a statutory employee in the "same employment" category.

It is a

well-established rule of statutory construction that when

t~

legislature amends a statute it is presumed to have been in·
tended that the statute have a different meaning than it had
prior to the amendment and such amendment indicates not only
the intention of the new law but also that of the old.

Leo·

nard Construction Company v. State Tax Commission, 539 P.Zd
246 (Idaho 1975).
Thus, had plaintiff been injured in an accident after t~ ,
effective date of the 1975 amendment it is probable, just as
in the Shupe case, that plaintiffs "would be left in court".
However, because this accident occurred prior to that amend·
ment the old statutory language and the applicable common law
created by this Court must apply.
Using this criteria there can be no question that both
plaintiffs and defendant Ready Mix Co. were subcontractors of
the general contractor Arctic Circle and were therefore co·
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employees pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-1-42.
The Gallegos case and the Adamson case clearly established
the proposition that an employee under Section 35-1-42 is
deemed a person of the same employment for purposes of Section 35-1-62.

Appellant's own pleadings establish the em-

ployee status of plaintiff Capson and defendant Ready Mix Co.
which standing alone is sufficient to divest the District
Court of jurisdiction.

As stated by this Court in the pre-

vious appeal:
The record does not reflect that he pursued anything or any procedure, discovery, or otherwise, that would overcome his own pleaded statements or admissions of an employer-employee relationship or substantiate his urgence for
the first time on appeal, of any debatable issue as to whether he was or was not
an employee in the Workman's Compensation
sense of the term. 556 P.2d at 506.
Aside from the statutory employee status, however, it
is obvious that plaintiff Capson was in the "same employment"
as Ready Mix when the activity surrounding the accident is
examined in light of the standards enumerated by this Court
in the first Peterson appeaL
Plaintiffs in their complaint alleged that Gilbert Capson has prepared the forms in the excavation of the building
and that defendant Ready Mix Co. was engaged in pouring cement into the forms at the time of the accident.
1-2).

(R.' pp.

Certainly the operator of defendant's cement truck and
-13-
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plaintiff Cap son were at the time of the injury "directly
operating with each other in the particular business at hand"
and were able to "exercise an influence upon each other to
use proper caution and be so situated in their labor to some
extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of
each other as to skill, diligence, and carefulness."
P.Zd at 1000.

493

Therefore, even under the common law termin-

ology of fellow servants it is apparent that plaintiff and
defendant were "in the same employment" at the time of the
accident and plaintiff was therefore precluded by the then
existing Section 35-1-62 from maintaining an action against
Ready Mix Co.
For the preceding reasons the trial court was correct
in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and holding that the prior statutory law precluded a suit against
defendant Ready Mix Co. by plaintiff Gilbert Capson.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF LINDA CAPSON AS
TO HER CLAIM OF CONSORTIUM AND FOR LOSS
OF SUPPORT AND MEDICAL EXPENSES.
Plaintiffs 1 second amended complaint alleged that plain·
tiff Linda Capson sustained "great and irreparable harm in
that she will be deprived of the services and support of her
husband and she will continue to be so permanently deprived
of the comfort and solace usually and ordinarily provided by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I
......

a husband in good health and unimpaired vigor."

(R., p. 35).

This language clearly speaks in terms of a claim for
loss of consortium.

This Court has conclusively established

that such a claim is invalid under Utah law.

In Ellis v.

Hathaway, 27 U.2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972) a wife sought to
recover for claimed loss of support, companionship, love and
affection because of injuries which her husband received in
an automobile accident.

This Court stated:

Plaintiffs are husband and wife. The husband was driving the car. He sued for injuries which he claims he received to his
neck. The wife sued for claimed loss of
support, companionship, love, and affection.
She does not call it consortium.
The wife has no basis for her action. At
common law she could not sue for loss of
consortium, and under the Married Women's
Act no cause of action was given to her for
negligent injury to her husband. Our statute placed husband and wife on an equal
basis by saying: ". . . There shall be no
right of recovery by the husband on account
of personal injury or wrong to his wife . . . "
(Citation to Section 30-2-4, U.C.A., 1953).
In light of the Ellis decision, the trial court was correct
in granting judgment against Linda Capson for her claims of
loss of consortium.
The trial court was equally correct in granting judgment
against plaintiff Linda Capson for her claim of loss of support and medical expenses arising therefrom.

Plaintiff's

amended complaint stated the following:
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That plaintiff Linda Capson has also been
damaged in that she has had to provide
from her own funds for the payment of medical expenses and the support of the family
of Gilbert Capson in the sum of approximately $18,000 and that she is thereby damaged in said sum.
(R., p. 35).
As stated in the Ellis opinion supra, a wife has no
cause of action for negligent injury to her husband.

Plain-

tiff Linda Capson is seeking to recover for medical expenses
and expenses for support of her family resulting from her
husband's injury.

Only her husband has a cause of action for

these alleged damages.
This Court in Corbridge v. M. Morrin & Son, Inc. 19 U.Zd
409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967) faced an analogous situation where a
husband was attempting to recover for his own lost wages and
expenses from missing work to provide care for his children
while his wife recovered from injuries which she sustained
from falling into an excavation.

In affirming the summary

judgment of the District Court against the husband this Court
relied upon Section 30-2-4 U.C.A., 1953 for the premise that
since a husband and wife were placed by the legislature on an
equal basis that neither spouse can recover for expenses in·
curred as a result of injuries to the other spouse.

This

Court in Corbridge stated:
The wife, (husband in the instant case) if
anybody, should recover the expenses incurred
in connection with her injuries. The reasonable value of the services which she was
-16-
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unable to perform as a result of her injuries and which she otherwise would have
performed would be part of her recovery
if any she is entitled to.
(Parentheses
added).
In addition, even if Linda Capson had a cause of action
for these damages, which she clearly does not as stated in
Corbridge, her husband is already seeking recovery for these
same damages and any recovery by her would be duplicitous.
Thus, the trial court properly granted judgment against
Linda Capson for her claims alleged in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that Utah law applicable
to this accident precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action
against defendant Ready Mix Co.

This Court's previous deci-

sions and the language of these statutes establish that plaintiff, as a subcontractor of Arctic Circle, Inc., and defendant, as a subcontractor of Arctic Circle Inc., were both
employees of Arctic Circle and were necessarily in the "same
employment" as specified in Section 35-1-62;

In addition,

under the standards of this Court in the Peterson case plaintiff and defendant's agent would be deemed fellow servants
under common law because of the type of work being done at
the time of the injury.
While it may be true as appellants point out in their
brief that it is unfair not to allow one subcontractor on a
job to sue another this unfairness is and was a question for
-17-
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the legislature and not for this Court.

The 1975 amendment

passed by the Utah legislature obviously eliminated this unfairness, if any, existing under the prior law but did so
only as to prospective injuries.
This Court in the Shupe case has already ruled that the
statute should not be applied retroactively because it would
deny equal protection of the laws to those people in the
class existing before the amendment and to those people after the amendment.

Appellants must be bound by this deci-

sion just as were the plaintiffs in Shupe.
Finally, the claims raised by plaintiff Linda Capson
are clearly without merit in that both loss of consortium
and expenses incurred for family support and medical expen·
ses are not recoverable under Utah law.
For these reasons the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HAi'JSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN
___
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TIMOTHY R. HANSON
~02 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, ,Utah
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